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Abstract
We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a
right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the
right-holder.
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Ar i g h to fﬁrst refusal (ROFR) is a contract clause that provides its holder with the right to
purchase an object at the highest price the seller is able to get from another buyer.1 In essence,
the clause awards a speciﬁc buyer the right to act after all her rivals have participated in some
form of bidding competition.2 ROFR clauses are broadly used in share transactions, lease
contracts, partnerships and professional sports, among many other cases (see Walker, 1999, for
more examples). In addition, a context where an ROFR arises naturally is that where the seller
a n dt h ef a v o r e db u y e ra r et w oﬁrms in the same conglomerate.
O n ep o s s i b l ej u s t i ﬁcation for introducing such a clause is that it could result in a higher joint
expected surplus for the seller and the right-holder in the bidding process —while generating a
negative externality on all other parties to the auction, since it creates an allocative distortion.
For instance, Choi (2003) shows that adding an ROFR clause to any of the four most usual
auctions (English, Dutch, ﬁrst- and second-price) results in a higher joint expected utility for
the seller and the favored bidder if there is only one unfavored rival. Along the same lines,
Burguet and Perry (2005) study the ﬁrst-price auction and conclude that, if the seller auctions
oﬀ a nR O F Ra n dt h e nc o n d u c t st h ea u c t i o nw i t haf a v o r e db i d d e rs h ew i l lr e c e i v e ,u n d e rs o m e
conditions, a higher expected price than she would by using a standard ﬁrst-price auction.
However, Bikhchandani et al. (2005) examine the ROFR in the context of a symmetric sealed-
bid second-price auction and ﬁnd that under private values, with at least three bidders, the
ROFR generates an increase in the expected surplus of the favored buyer that exactly equals
the loss to the seller. With interdependent values, their joint surplus may rise or fall.
In this note, we complement those results. We show that, under independent private values,
no mechanism that includes an ROFR clause can maximize the joint expected surplus of the
seller and the right-holder. Adding such a clause to any given auction format, then, is jointly
suboptimal for the two parties involved.
2 The suboptimality result
The owner of a single, indivisible object is selling it through an auction. For simplicity, we
assume the seller attaches no value to the object. There are N ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders. Bidder
i’s valuation for the object, vi, is distributed according to a c.d.f. Fi with support on the interval
[v,v] and a density fi that is positive and bounded on the whole support. Bidders’ valuations
are independent.
We want to characterize a selling mechanism that maximizes the sum of the expected utilities
of the seller and a speciﬁc buyer. Without loss of generality, we assume that the favored buyer
is bidder 1. Our problem is a slight modiﬁcation of the standard optimal auction problem
1All our results are valid as well in the case of procurement auctions, where an ROFR is usually referred to
as a meet-the-competition clause. For ease of exposition, however, in this note we will stick to the case of a
seller favoring a speciﬁc potential buyer.
2We present here the simplest and most frequently used ROFR. For other possible versions of the clause, see
Walker (1999) and Grosskopf and Roth (forthcoming).
1with independent private values.3 We solve it following the usual steps in the literature. Let
Hi(v1,...,vN) (Pi(v1,...,vN)) be the probability that bidder i gets the object (respectively, the
price bidder i has to pay to the seller) if bidder valuations are given by (v1,...,vN). In addition,
let hi(vi) (pi(vi)) be the expected probability that bidder i gets the object (respectively, the
expected price she pays) when her valuation is vi, and the valuations of all other bidders are
unknown.










Ui(vi)=e Ui(vi,v i)=hi(vi)vi − pi(vi)












subject to the standard incentive compatibility and participation constraints
Ui(vi) ≥ e Ui(vi,v
0
i) for all i,f o ra l lvi,v
0
i
Ui(vi) ≥ 0 for all i,f o ra l lvi
Let e vi(vi) be the valuation that bidder i announces optimally when her true valuation is vi.
Clearly, by incentive compatibility, it has to be true that e vi(vi)=vi and Ui(vi)=e Ui(vi,e vi(vi)).






e Ui(vi,e vi(vi)) = hi(vi).
Therefore, it follows that Ui(vi)=
R vi
v hi(s)ds+Ui(v). Stated in a way that is more convenient





















3See Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1982).
4This can be thought as an extension to the N-bidder context of a particular case of the analysis in Naegelen
and Mougeot (1998), when there is no consumer surplus, the shadow cost of public funds is zero and the domestic
ﬁrm proﬁtw e i g h ti so n e .
5Note that U1(v) may be zero or positive in a solution to our problem. Given that we are adding the expected
utilities of the seller and bidder 1, how much the latter pays (as long as incentive compatibility holds) does not
aﬀect the objective function. There is a solution, however, where U1(v)=0 .











fi(vi) is bidder i’s “virtual” valuation, which we assume increasing.








The allocation rule that maximizes the joint expected surplus is then
H1(v1,...,vN)=
½




1 if Ji(vi) > max{v1,maxj6=i Jj(vj)}
0 otherwise
for i>1. That is, the unfavored bidder with the highest virtual valuation gets the object unless
her virtual valuation is lower than the favored bidder’s actual valuation. In the latter case, the
favored bidder gets the object. A standard revenue-maximizing auction would compare all
bidders’ virtual valuations and select the highest, while this mechanism replaces the favored
bidder’s virtual with her actual valuation in that comparison.6 S i n c ew ea r em a x i m i z i n gt h e
sum of the expected utilities of the seller and the favored bidder, we can interpret v1 as the
seller’s valuation. Thus, the allocation rule that follows is the same as in a revenue-maximizing
auction when the seller has a positive (but not known in advance) valuation for the object.
Let us now turn to the ROFR clause. As mentioned above, the favored bidder has the right
to match the highest price the seller is able to obtain from any of her rivals. Naturally, the right-
holder will match whenever the highest standing price is lower than or equal to her valuation,
and she will not match otherwise. Hence, if a mechanism including an ROFR maximized
joint expected surplus, the price that the favored bidder would have to match to win would
always be the highest among her rivals’ virtual valuations. Therefore, we would necessarily
have, for all i>1,t h a tPi(v1,...,vN)=Ji(vi) whenever bidder i gets the object. Let li(vi)=
Ev−i [Pi(vi,v −i) | Ji(vi) < max{v1,maxj6=i Jj(vj)}] b et h ee x p e c t e dp r i c et h a tb i d d e ri pays given
that she does not get the object and her valuation is vi. By incentive compatibility,
pi(vi)=hi(vi)Ji(vi)+[ 1− hi(vi)]li(vi) (2)
If there is a way to make an auction with an ROFR clause maximize joint expected surplus
of the seller and the right-holder, both equations (1) and (2) must hold for all i>1.B u tw e







6Note as well that in our simpliﬁed setting the object is always awarded to some bidder, since the favored
bidder’s valuation cannot be negative.
3If, as is most usual, only the bidder that gets the object pays a positive price, li(vi)=0for




1 − Fi (vi)
fi(vi)
equations (1) and (2) cannot be satisﬁed at the same time. So it follows that no standard
auction with an ROFR clause can achieve joint surplus maximization.







− [1 − hi(vi)]li(vi)
for all i>1. Evaluating this expression at vi = v, we conclude that Ui(v)=0 ,w h i c hi sa b s u r d .
Hence, no auction with an ROFR clause maximizes the sum of the utility of the seller and
the favored bidder. The intuition is clear. Obtaining the payment scheme that maximizes joint
surplus determines the allocation rule and the expected payment of each bidder conditional
on her valuation. Having an ROFR clause that satisﬁes joint surplus maximization, if it were
achievable, would force each nonfavored bidder to pay her own virtual valuation when winning,
which does not coincide with the payment rule determined by the allocation rule and incentive
compatibility.
Many mechanisms implement the allocation that maximizes joint surplus, although they are
necessarily more complex than adding an ROFR clause to a standard auction. For instance,
the seller could ask the favored bidder to announce her valuation (either directly or by making
a bid), and then conduct an English auction among unfavored bidders, with individual reserve
prices set in such a way that only bidders whose virtual valuation exceeds the favored bidder’s
actual valuation decide to participate. The favored bidder’s expected payment, of course, should
follow from incentive compatibility. Alternatively, the seller could run a ﬁrst -or second- price
auction with an adequately chosen advantage for the favored bidder: she would lose only if
a rival’s bid were higher than hers by a margin that reveals that the rival’s virtual valuation
exceeds her actual one.
To conclude, let us note that our result on the suboptimality of ROFR clauses reinforces
the conclusions in Bikhchandani et al. (2005). ROFR clauses should be explained by reasons
beyond the simple one-time interaction between the seller and a favored buyer, and should not
be awarded lightly by sellers.
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